ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
It could be said that the phenomenon of the disclosure of so many corruption cases at the regional level has never happened in the history 
Internal Control System
The audit results of the First Semester of 2014 showed 5,948 cases of weakness of internal control system consisting of 3 (three)
finding groups, namely: the weakness of accounting and reporting control system, the weaknesses of budget implementation control system, and the weakness of the internal control structure as presented in table 1. 
Fraud, Waste dan Abuse
According to Singleton (2002) , the definition of fraud can vary depending on who defines it and how the condition of the person who defines it. One can define fraud as intentional fraud (including lying and cheating), and is the opposite of the truth, justice and honesty. 
Fraud Triangle
Cressey ( (Dreher, 2006; Treisman, 2000) , public sector in the economy (Tanzi, 1998; Treisman, 2000) , 
Corruption in Indonesia
Arifianto (2004) 
Data Sources
In this study, interviews were conducted with 87 treasurers and former treasurers in four 
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTION Conclusion
Compared with other law enforcement agencies such as the Attorney, the National Police and Anti-Corruption Commission (KPK), in preventing corruption, BPK has a very strategic role to carry out performance checks and specific goals that can support the disclosure of fraud, including corruption. BPK's audit report could be valid records and supporting data to know the initial indications of corruption as well as preventive measures.
As the government's external auditor, BPK should ideally not be too preoccupied by the audit monopoly, particularly on the compliance with the budget governance that seems never be completed. As a result, chronic and recurring governance error can never be fixed and even seem to be allowed, for example, in grant, social assistance and improvement of public services, such as licensing and payment of regional taxes.
One of the factors that have caused the proliferation of corruption over the years is the discretionary authority of BPK not to submit the findings of potential losses to the law enforcers when they have been returned. In fact, the BPK's audit findings are much more qualified than public complaints in general. Audit findings on the result of fraud detection will facilitate the determination of the suspect. BPK can find risk factors that correlate with certain characteristics of the same examination object (corruption with variables existing in regional government).
Suggestion
The number of BPK members should not be too many much less the partisans who have no background in auditing. It is believed to have strong correlation with the quality of audit report. The argument is that BPK is a professional audit institution whose output is not a political product. The independence of BPK in recruiting personnel is strongly needed, because so far BPK has been dependent on the government as well as promotion policy. There is an impression that the independence of BPK is just a discourse. Political interest has been successfully reducing the performance of BPK. In the field of prevention, President, Ministry of Home Affairs and Ministry of Finance need to conduct monitoring closely so that the BPK's recommendation for governance improvement could be obeyed. Laws even provide criminal sanctions when the BPK's recommendation is ignored.
